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Abstract
In a randomly determined order, each agent was given an indepen-
dent, private signal aboutwhich of two states was selected by a random
draw. After receiving the private signal each agent made a publicly
announced decision about the state. Thus, at the time of personal de-
cision each agent had a private signal and also knew the decisions of
all preceding agents. The experiments focused on three di®erent types
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of organization. (1) Agents were rewarded according to whether their
announced decision was right or wrong. This \individualistic institu-
tion" is the one studied by Anderson and Holt (AER, 1997). Their
discovery of information cascades is replicated. (2) Agents were re-
warded according to whether a majority of announced decisions were
right or wrong. Under this \majority rule institution" the instance
of information cascades is sharply reduced. (3) Agents are rewarded
more according to whether their personal announced decision was the
same as the majority decision than they were rewarded if their decision
was correct. This \conformity rewarding institution" is motivated by
proceedings in which there is incentive to produce reports that con-
form to the reports of others. Substantial information cascades are
observed.
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1 Introduction
This paper contributes to a discussion about the ability of decision processes
to aggregate information that is distributed across di®erent agents. The
literature re°ects an attempt to understand how di®erent institutions and
di®erent incentives in°uence information production and use. The quality of
information production and use can be viewed from two di®erent perspec-
tives. First, is the point of view of an individual who is making a decision
and living with the consequences. The second is the view of an outsider
1The ¯nancial support of the National Science Foundation and the Laboratory of Ex-
perimental Economics and Political Science is gratefully acknowledged. We are also deeply
appreciative of the collaboration of David Winkler who developed the software programs
and helped extensively with the experiments.
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who is making inferences about the underlying state based on the pattern of
individual decisions and the other observable properties of the system. The
analysis uses both perspectives.
In all environments studied here each agent was given an independent,
private signal about which of two states had been chosen by a random draw.
After receiving the private signal each agent was called upon according to a
randomly determined sequence to announce a decision about the state. That
is, the individual's decision was publicly announced before a decision was
made by the succeeding individual. The decision of an individual was not
necessarily a report of the individual's private information, but instead was
an announcement that would have an in°uence on the individual's payo®.
Thus, at the time of personal decision each agent had a private signal and
also knew the decisions of all preceding agents. The agent was aware of
the rules that governed the relationships among announced decisions and
individual payo®s.
The experiments focused on three di®erent types of institutions consisting
of di®erent rules and organization. (1) Agents were rewarded according to
whether their announced decision was right or wrong. This organization
is the \individualistic institution" studied by Anderson and Holt (1997).
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(2) Agents were rewarded according to whether a majority of announced
decisions were right or wrong under the \majority rule institution." (3)
Agents are rewarded more according to whether their personal announced
decision was the same as the majority decision than they were rewarded for
a correct decision under the \conformity rewarding institution."
The paper poses three fundamental questions. First, do the results of
Anderson and Holt (1997) replicate? The second question is related to the
organization of the decision process, the rules that are in place governing
individual rewards and incentives. Do the rules make a di®erence? Third,
can the in°uence of the organization be detected in models of individual
decisions? While a complete model of the individual agent decision is not
developed, several incomplete models are employed to facilitate an answer to
this question.
First, the Anderson and Holt observation that information cascades will
occur in particular environments is strongly upheld by the experiments we
report2. When the individual's payo® is determined by his/her own an-
nounced decisions then individuals tend to treat their private signal as irrel-
2The Anderson and Holt results have also been replicated by Wilinger and Ziegelmeyer
(1997).
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evant and follow the trend of their predecessors, if a clear pattern is present.
In this sense the results reported here are consistent with a long history that
has many roots in psychology3. Second, we ¯nd that relative to the indi-
vidualistic institution studied by Anderson and Holt, the predominance of
information cascades sharply decreases with the change in institution to a
majority rule process. The data reported here are consistent with the data
from experiments of majority rule jury decisions studied by McKelvey and
Palfrey (1998). Furthermore, the tendency to cascade increases when the
conformity rewarding institution is implemented. Finally, following Grether
(1980), we begin to explore the quantitative e®ects of changes in institution
on the nature of individual decisions. While the model we explore is clearly
incomplete, it provides a framework within which individual decisions are
understandable.
The paper is divided into seven sections plus an appendix. Section 2 dis-
cusses the institutions. Section 3 is the experimental design. Section 4 is an
outline of measures of information production. This is the information that
participants in the process and an outside observer of the process might infer
3A good introduction to the way psychologists have studied this problem is contained
in Aronson, et. al. (1997).
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from behavior. Section 5 are measures that re°ect on how individuals use
information. While we have no complete theory of individual behavior, this
section develops a model that facilitates interpretations. Section 6 summa-
rizes models of individual announcements. Section 7 summarizes the results,
and Section 8 concludes.
2 Institutions: The Rules and Procedures
The study of rules and procedures initiates an investigation of the relation-
ships among incentives, the technology of communication and the informa-
tion producing properties of decision making systems. In all of the systems
explored here the technology of communication is the same. It is sequential in
the sense that the individuals make their announced decisions in a randomly
determined order and at the time of the decision they have private informa-
tion in addition to the public announcements of all who went before them.
They also know that all decision makers operate under the same conditions.
Thus, by changing the rules while maintaining the communications technol-
ogy, we are able to gain insights about the relationship between information
derived from the behavior of others, incentives and private information.
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2.1 The Individualistic Institution
The ¯rst set of rules which we call the \individualistic institution," are those
studied by Anderson and Holt. When individuals make decisions they have
their own private information plus the information contained in the decisions
of those who made decisions in the past. Furthermore, aside from information
(externality) issues, the e®ects of an individual's decisions are con¯ned to the
individual who makes the decision. Examples include models of job search,
¯nancial markets, fads, and herd behavior (see Bikhchandani, et al. (1998)
for an overview of applications). The basic question is whether all of the
relevant information available was contained in the decisions with economic
consequences or were people mislead in a cascading manner.
2.2 The Majority Rule Institution
The second set of rules is the collective decision rule of majority rule. The fre-
quency with which majority rule is used to make important decisions makes
it a natural candidate for study. In this case the e®ects of an individual's
announced decision are not con¯ned to the individual. The individual an-
nounced decisions become votes which tie the consequences of individuals
together in the sense that all individuals must abide by the same decision
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and that is the decision of a majority. Individuals are given the latitude of
how they vote in the context of this group decision but they cannot make
independent payo® relevant decisions apart from the vote. The study of ma-
jority rule has theoretical interest. In particular it is non manipulable so
there is a presumption that the \best information" will be produced.
2.3 Conformity Rewarding Institution
The third rule is a rule in which there are special incentives to conform to
the decision of a majority. These are \conformity rewarding" incentives. In
this environment individuals have an incentive to be right but they have a
bigger incentive to not deviate from the decisions of others.
Pressures to conform to group behaviors have been widely discussed for
many decades. For example, the early literature on cascades was viewed as a
study of conformity resulting from the nature of groups and social interaction
(Asch, 1958). In addition, groups are viewed as \punishing" deviates thereby
providing private incentives for individuals to conform to the patterns of
behavior of others in the group (Schachter, 1951). Indeed, political processes
and perhaps even managements are sometimes viewed has generating distrust
or lack of con¯dence in those whose opinions and voting patterns are di®erent
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from those of the majority. In this context the use of grand jury procedures
is of special interest because of the possibility of charges of perjury that can
result from testimony that di®ers from the testimony of others. In all such
cases the truth may never be known but instead is assumed to be captured by
the announcements of a majority. Thus, personal rewards and punishments
are closely tied to consistency with the decisions and recorded opinions of
others, independent of whether such decisions and opinions are closely tied
to the truth.
3 Experimental Design
Four experiments were conducted in the Laboratory for Experimental Eco-
nomics and Political Science at Caltech. Each experiment had 10 Caltech
undergraduates as subjects. The experiments consisted of 28-55 periods and
lasted for about one and a half hours. The procedures described below were
adapted from those used by Anderson and Holt (1997). Some changes re°ect
employment of computers. The nature of incentives were changed to save
money. The four experiments are summarized in Table 1.
Experiment 1 most closely resembles the experiments of Anderson and
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Holt (1997). In experiment 1, the urn that was to be used each period was
randomly predetermined. Urn A contained two RED balls and one WHITE
ball, and urn B contained two WHITE balls and one RED ball. Each period,
the contents of the chosen urn were emptied into an unmarked container.
Subjects were then approached in a random order by the experimenter and
would make one private draw, with replacement. After seeing the draw, the
subject was asked to record the color of the draw and his decision on a record
sheet. The experimenter then announced the decision, and all the subjects
would record this decision on their record sheets. The process was repeated
until all subjects had made decisions, at which time the actual urn used was
announced. Subjects were asked to record their earnings: $2 if their decision
was correct, and $0 otherwise. Experiment 1 consisted of 28 periods.
In experiment 2, the procedure was the same, except that subjects in-
teracted with computer terminals rather than the experimenter. A subject
is \approached" by the computer and given a draw by an announcement
of \Your draw is WHITE" or \Your draw is RED." After seeing the draw,
subjects were then asked to enter their decision into a box on the screen.
All the subjects would then see this decision on their screens. As before,
subjects were asked to record their draws, their own decisions, and the deci-
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sions of others on a record sheet. This process was repeated until all subjects
had made decisions, at which time the actual urn used would appear on the
subjects' screens. In periods 1-10 and 26-36, the \individualistic" periods,
subjects would also see their payo® on the screen, $2 for a correct decision,
and -$2 otherwise. In periods 11-25, the \majority" periods, subjects would
see the \group decision" as well as their payo® on the screen. The group de-
cision was determined by majority rule, with ties broken randomly. Subjects
were paid $2 for a correct group decision, and -$2 for an incorrect decision,
regardless of their own decision.
Experiment 3 di®ered from experiment 2 in that periods 1-10 and 26-38
were \majority" periods, and periods 11-25 were \individualistic" periods,
and in that subjects were paid $1 for a correct decision or correct group
decision, and -$1 otherwise.
In experiment 4, we introduce the \conformity rewarding" institution.
In these rounds, the payo® to a subject is determined by his whether her
private decision is correct, and also if her private decision matches the group
decision, where once again, the group decision is determined by majority
rule. Subjects are paid $0.25 for a correct private decision and -$0.25 for an
incorrect decision, and they are paid $0.75 for a private decision that matches
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the group decision and -$0.75 for a private decision that does not match the
group decision.
4 Three Measures of System Performance
The literature seems to assume that cascades indicate poor information pro-
duction and use within the system, which leads to poor system performance.
However, this assumption is not entirely correct. Cascade behavior can result
in better decisions because it does involve aspects of information aggregation.
Thus in order to assess such possibilities, we explore two related measures of
systemic performance in addition to the traditional measure of cascades : the
e±ciency of systemic decisions and the quality of information production.
4.1 Traditional Information Cascades
Our initial interest in studying information production was the study of the
phenomena of cascades. The consensus in the literature is that a cascade is
de¯ned by a sequence of individuals whose decisions do not depend on their
private information (see Smith and Sorenson, 1997 or Bikchandani et al.,
1998). Following Anderson and Holt, we add the additional stipulation (that
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is usually implicit in the de¯nition) that a cascade is de¯ned by an established
pattern of decisions together with the presence of subsequent decisions that
are consistent with this pattern, but inconsistent with the private draws.
4.2 E±ciency of Systemic Decisions
Systemic e±ciency is the degree to which actual systemic decisions coincide
with the decisions that would result if all underlying information available
to the system (in the form of private signals) was made publicly available at
the time of decisions.
The subjects' actual decisions are compared with the fully informed de-
cision, the decision that they would have made (assuming that they are
rational, expected payo® maximizers) if they had known the information in
the system, the entire sequence of true signals. Clearly, for the individualistic
and conformity rewarding institutions, the systemic decision is the vector of
the individuals' announcements. However, for the majority rule institution
the individual announcements are, in e®ect, votes that determine the unique
systemic decision. The quality of systemic decision is measured each period
as the proportion of the systemic decisions that match the fully informed
decision.
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Let aij be individual i's announcement in period j . The systemic decision,
sdj; is a function of the vector of the individual's announcements, where the
function depends on the institution:
sdj = G(a1j; :::a10j)
Under the individualistic and conformity rewarding institutions,
sdj = G(a1j; :::a10j) = (a1j; :::a10j)
and under the majority rule institution,
sdj = G(a1j; :::a10j) =
8>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>:
(A;A; :::A) if
P10
i=1 1 faij = Ag > 5
(B;B; :::B) if
P10
i=1 1faij = Ag < 5
( 12A+
1
2B;
1
2A+
1
2B; :::
1
2A +
1
2B) else
where 1f²g is the indicator function. Then we can de¯ne the e±ciency of
systemic decisions in period j as:
(e±ciency of sd )j =
P10
i=1 1fsdij = fdjg
10
where sdij is individual i's systemic decision in period j and fdj is the fully
informed decision of period j.
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4.3 Quality of Information Production
Another measure of system performance is the amount of the underlying in-
formation of the system that is exposed to an outside observer. Consider an
observer who is outside of the decision process and from only the announce-
ments of the subjects must make inferences about the true state of the world.
A variety of such measures exists depending upon the behavior of the indi-
viduals assumed by the outside observer's inference process. The measure
used here assumes that the individual's announcement re°ects the state of
the world that he thinks is most likely. The outside observer's posterior
probabilities of the true state are compared with those of an observer who
can observe all the private signals. The quality of information production is
measured using the absolute di®erence between the posterior probabilities of
an outside observer who observes only the entire sequence of announcements
and the posterior probabilities of an outside observer who observes the entire
sequence of private signals:
(quality of ip)j = 1¡ jPr(Aja1j; :::a10j)¡ Pr(Ajd1j; :::d10j)j
where a1j; :::a10j is the sequence of announcements in period j and d1j; :::d10j
is the sequence of private draws in period j . As the absolute di®erence
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decreases, the quality of information production increases. Therefore, the
best quality of information production has a quality of one, and the worst
has a quality of zero.
5 A measure of individual use of information
While the focus of the study is on institutions and the e®ects of the insti-
tutions, as opposed to individual behavior, one way to capture that e®ect
is in terms of the individual. Thus, even though we might not have a good
understanding of exactly why individuals behave as they do, certain models
will help us detect when they are behaving di®erently and how their behavior
di®ers under di®erent institutions.
Before announcing an urn, a subject has two sources of information: her
private draw, and the announcements of those who preceded her. The Gen-
eral Decision-Weight model is constructed on the premise that a subject's
announcement is based on these two sources. Given a pattern of announce-
ments, the model allocates weight that a subject places on her public infor-
mation (the preceding announcements) relative to the weight that she places
on her private information in making her announcement.
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Let A be the event that urn A is the true urn, and B be the event that
urn B is the true urn. The relative odds in favor of A can be expressed as:
P(A)
1¡P (A) =
P (A)
P (B) :
Clearly, the odds depend on the information available. Let xit = (ait; dit)
be the information that individual i has at position t. Let ait denote the
announcements that individual i has heard at position t, and let dit denote
the private draw of individual i at position t. For a Bayesian individual i
who makes his decision at position t:
P (Ajxit)
P (Bjxit) =
P (xitjA)P (A)=P (xit)
P (xitjB)P (B)=P (xit) =
P (xitjA)P (A)
P (xitjB)P (B)
If ait and dit are independent (conditional on a given urn), then the individ-
ual's subjective posterior odds in favor of urn A are given as:
P (Ajxit)
P (Bjxit)
=
P (xitjA)P (A)
P (xitjB)P (B)
=
P (aitjA)
P (aitjB)
P (ditjA)
P (ditjB)
P (A)
P (B)
Now taking logs, we ¯nd
ln
"
P (Ajxit)
P (Bjxit)
#
= ln
P (aitjA)
P (aitjB) + ln
P (ditjA)
P (ditjB) + ln
P (A)
P (B)
which can be generalized to:
Yit = ®+ ¯ ln
"
P (aitjA)
P (aitjB)
#
+ ° ln
"
P (ditjA)
P (ditjB)
#
+ ± ln
"
P (A)
P (B)
#
+ uit
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where Yit = ln
h
P (Ajxit)
P(Bjxit)
i
; ®; ¯; °; and ± are unknown scalars; and uit is a
random disturbance.
We do not observe the subjective log odds Yit. If we assume that the
individual chooses the urn believed to be most likely, we observe the discrete
variable Y ¤it , which equals one if Yit is positive (\A" is announced), and zero
otherwise. The parameters of this binary response model may be estimated
by maximum likelihood under distributional assumptions on uit, given that
the matrix of independent variables is of full rank. However, because the
prior odds are ¯xed throughout the experiment, ± is not identi¯ed. Note
that ln
h
P (A)
P (B)
i
= 0; therefore, this term drops out and the intercept can be
identi¯ed separately. We can rewrite the model as:
Yit = ® + ¯ ln
"
P (aitjA)
P (aitjB)
#
+ ° ln
"
P (ditjA)
P (ditjB)
#
+ uit (1)
For the \private information" variable, the variable associated with the
coe±cient °, we assume that subjects are Bayesian. That is, if dit = R, then
ln
h
P(dit jA)
P (ditjB)
i
= ln

2
3
1
3
¸
= ln2 and if dit = W , then ln
h
P (dit jA)
P(dit jB)
i
= ln

1
3
2
3
¸
=
¡ ln 2:
The \public information" variable is calculated using the following for-
mula: if nit is the number of \urn A" announcements and mit is the number
of \urn B" announcements that individual i has heard when he is called upon
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to make his report his decision at position t, then ln
h
P (aitjA)
P (aitjB)
i
= ln
h
2nit
2mit
i
=
(nit ¡mit) ln 2.
Grether (1980) used this model to study Bayesian updating in a similar
experimental setting. Following Grether (1980), we estimate a logit model
under the assumption that the disturbances uit are identically and indepen-
dently distributed logistic with mean zero. Without further assumptions on
this distribution, the parameters ®; ¯; ° are identi¯ed only up to an unknown
scale. However, identi¯cation up to an unknown scale is su±cient for our
analysis.
We de¯ne the Equal Decision-weight model as a special case of this model
with ® = 0; ¯ = ° = ± and uit = 0 for all i; t. If the individual weighs public
information more than private information, then ¯
°
> 1; and if the individual
weighs private information more than public information, then ¯° < 1.
6 Models of Individual Announcements
Even though the environment is not particularly complex we were unable
to solve and apply a complete model from game theory. For example, we
attempted to model and solve this as an extensive form game without success.
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We also attempted to solve the Quantal Response model (McKelvey and
Palfrey, 1995), but were unsuccessful. We are left with only simple and
partial models with which to understand the behavior that is taking place.
Four models follow naturally from the literature. The ¯rst two we call
\rules of thumb" because they are non-Bayesian and non-strategic. A third
model is that of a naive Bayesian. While we do not have a strategic model,
we can provide as a fourth \model" some observations about elements of
strategic behavior.
These models serve two functions. The ¯rst is to capture important
elements of individual behavior. The second is the relate behavior to insti-
tutional context so that the in°uence of institutions can be detailed. Table
2 summarizes the predictions for all the models. The third column gives
predictions for ¯ and °, the weights placed on public and private informa-
tion available, respectively. Columns four through seven rank the predicted
prevalence of cascades and both components of quality.
6.1 Private information Revealer
According to the ¯rst rule of thumb, everyone behaves as a pure \signal
revealer." That is, everyone's announcement perfectly matches his private
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draw. The individual ignores the public information available in making his
decision.
At an individual level, we would expect to see that individuals are plac-
ing little weight on the public information available, because their decision
is based purely on the private information. In terms of the general deci-
sion weight model, if subjects are acting as private information revealers, we
would expect to ¯nd that ¯ is not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero, as seen
in Table 2. At an aggregate level, there would be no cascades. Quality
of information production would be high for all institutions. E±ciency of
systemic decisions would be low for the individualistic and conformity re-
warding institutions and high for the majority rule institution. Moreover,
the institutional context would have no in°uence.
6.2 Public information Revealer
The second rule of thumb is a rule in which the announcement of a subject
other than the ¯rst person perfectly matches the public information available
at the time. The individual, therefore, disregards her private information in
making her decision. At an individual level, we would expect to see little
weight being put on private information; that is, we would expect to ¯nd that
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° is not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. At the aggregate level, we would
expect to see cascade behavior every round. The additional measures of
systemic performance would be low if individuals acted as public information
revealers. As was the case with the other rule of thumb, the institutional
context should have no impact on behavior.
6.3 Naive Bayesians
Consider a model of behavior in which the subjects are \naive Bayesians" in
the sense that the subjects take into account both private and public infor-
mation in making their announcements, but this is not common knowledge.
This seems to be the primary model used in the literature. An individual be-
lieves that the announcements that he has heard perfectly match the private
draws of his predecessors. That is, the individual believes that his predeces-
sors have chosen according to their private information alone, without regard
to the announcements they have heard. However, his own decision is based
solely on his posterior subjective probabilities that are updated every period
using Bayes' Law, taking into account both private and public information.
These individuals act according to the Equal Decision-Weight model: they
place equal weight on public and private information. If the subjects act as
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naive Bayesians, then the hypothesis that ¯ = ° can not be rejected.
At the aggregate level, we would expect to see cascades: as soon as there
is an imbalance of public announcements, a cascade will start. For all the in-
stitutions, quality of information production would be lower than the quality
that would result if subjects were private information revealers, but higher
than the quality that would result if they were public information revealers.
The e±ciency of systemic decisions would be higher than the qualities that
result from the public information revealers. Furthermore, under the indi-
vidualistic and conformity rewarding institutions, the e±ciency of systemic
decisions would be higher than that of the private information revealers.
Notice that this model has a clear consequence. As with the rules of
thumb, individual announcements will not change with the institution. Ac-
cording to the model, individuals believe that other individuals have ac-
curately reported their observations but in making a personal report the
individual announces her belief about the most likely state with all the infor-
mation integrated. Thus the individual is naive about the behavior of others
and in developing the consequences of her announcement.
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6.4 Strategic Players
The fourth \model" is a collection of properties. Consider subjects who
are strategic: they respond to their incentives, they take into account both
public and private information before making their announcements, there is
a non-zero probability that they may make errors and they believe that other
subjects behave the same way.
In the individualistic institution, subjects place more weight on private
than on public information for two reasons. First, there is some probabil-
ity that previous announcements re°ect some error. Second, because other
subjects are acting strategically as well, the announcements do not perfectly
reveal private signals. In fact, they realize that once a cascade has started,
subsequent announcements which follow the cascade reveal no new informa-
tion. For strategic players in the individualistic institution, the hypothesis
that ¯° < 1 can not be rejected. Cascade behavior would be apparent, but
less prevalent than if the subjects were naive Bayesians. E±ciency of sys-
temic decisions and quality of information production would be higher than
the measures that would result if players were Naive Bayesians.
The majority rule mechanism, as mentioned above, is an incentive com-
patible mechanism. In the context of a majority rule decision making system,
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given a belief that others are doing the same, it is in the subjects' best inter-
est to announce the state of the world re°ected by their private information
alone4. Therefore, strategic players should act as private information reveal-
ers in the majority rule case.
Given the belief that others are behaving the same, a strategic player in
the conformity rewarding institution should consider the majority winner of
the announcements that precede him. This should then be his announcement.
Strategic players in the conformity rewarding institution should therefore act
as public information revealers.
7 Results
7.1 Data Examples
Consider some examples of periods from the actual experiments. The columns
represent the order in which individuals saw their draws and made their an-
nouncements. The ¯rst row is the private draw of the individual. It was
either a Red ball (which suggests urn A) or a White ball (which suggests urn
4For a theoretical proof of existence of this equilibrium under a majority rule institution
with sequential voting, see Dekel and Piccione (1997) or Fey (1998).
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B). The private draws are recoded as A or B, accordingly, to facilitate the
analysis. The second row gives the announcements of the individuals. The
relative odds of urn A given the private draw are given in row three. Row
four gives the relative odds of urn A given the announcements heard up to
that point, assuming that all previous announcements perfectly reveal the
private signal.
In experiment 1, period 10, in which the individualistic institution was
in e®ect, each subject's announcement perfectly revealed his signal except
the subject who made the eighth announcement. His announcement re°ects
cascades behavior: his announcement is inconsistent with his private draw,
but consistent with the majority of the preceding announcements. Note
that period 10 is only a partial cascade because of the subject who made the
fourth announcement. Even though she has heard a predominance of \B"
announcements, she chooses to follow her private information.
Both measures of system performance are high in this period. In this pe-
riod, the fully informed decision is \B". Therefore, the e±ciency of systemic
decisions, the proportion of decisions that match the fully informed decision
is 0.8. Furthermore, the measure of the quality of information production
is 0.96.
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Subjects do not act as either private nor public information revealers
in this period. The behavior seen here is consistent with both the naive
Bayesian and the strategic player models.
Individualistic Institution, Experiment 1, Period 10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 actual cascade?
draw a b b a b b b a b b
announcement A B B A B B B B B B B partial
Pr(Ajdt)
Pr(Bjdt) 2
1
2
1
2 2
1
2
1
2
1
2 2
1
2
1
2
Pr(Ajat)
Pr(Bjat) 1 2 1
1
2
1 1
2
1
4
1
8
1
16
1
32
at = announcements that have been made by position t, dt = private draw at position t
In experiment 3, period 30 in which the majority rule institution is in
place, we see no cascades. Every subject's announcement perfectly matches
her private draw. In this case, both components of quality attain the max-
imum possible value. The e±ciency of systemic decisions is 1.0, and the
measure of quality of information production is 1.0.
Behavior this period is consistent with both the private information re-
vealer and strategic player models of behavior.
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Majority Rule Institution, Experiment 3, Period 30
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 actual cascade?
draw a a a a a b a a a b
announcement A A A A A B A A A B A no
Pr(Ajdt)
Pr(Bjdt) 2 2 2 2 2
1
2 2 2 2
1
2
Pr(Ajat)
Pr(Bjat) 1 2 4 8 16 32 16 32 64 128
at = announcements that have been made by position t, dt = private draw at position t
In experiment 4, period 10, in which the conformity rewarding institution
is in place, we see dramatic cascade behavior. All but three of the announce-
ments are inconsistent with the private draw. Both components of informa-
tion quality are low. The e±ciency of systemic decisions is 0.3. The measure
of the quality of information production is 0.06. Lastly, the observed be-
havior is consistent with the public information revealer and strategic player
models of behavior.
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Conformity Rewarding Institution, Experiment 4, Period 10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 actual cascade?
draw a b b b a b b b a b
announcement A A A A A A A A A A B yes
Pr(Ajdt)
Pr(Bjdt) 2
1
2
1
2
1
2 2
1
2
1
2
1
2 2
1
2
Pr(Ajat)
Pr(Bjat) 1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512
at = announcements that have been made by position t, dt = private draw at position t
7.2 Statements of Results
The cascade phenomenon described by Anderson and Holt is replicated in
these experiments. A prevalence of cascade behavior is observed in the peri-
ods in which the individualistic institution is in place. As summarized by the
following result, the phenomenon is observed even though di®erent subject
pools, instructions, and procedures are in place.
Result 1 The Anderson and Holt results are replicated for the individual-
istic institution. Furthermore, their results are robust to changes in
payo®s and experimental settings.
Support In 77.5% of individualistic institution rounds, we observe cascade
behavior; that is we see reports that are inconsistent with the private
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draw, but are consistent with a pattern established by the predeces-
sors.5
Of course it is important to make sure that a fundamental bias is not
the explanation for the observation of cascades. Estimation of the General
Decision-Weight Model can reveal the occurrence of a bias toward one urn or
the other. Table 3 presents the results of estimation of the General Decision-
Weight Model (Equation 1). We do not ¯nd any bias toward one urn or the
other.
Result 2 The cascade phenomena is not due to an urn bias.
Support We ¯nd that, in equation 1, H0 : ® = 0 cannot be rejected at any
reasonable signi¯cance level (See Table 4).
The next result establishes that behavior responds to institutions. In
particular, using the measure of individual behavior, we rule out the simple
models of behavior: the private information revealer and public information
5Note that in reporting the proportion of cascades, Anderson and Holt begin by elimi-
nating rounds in which there is not \an imbalance of previous inferred signals." However,
in reporting our results, we include all rounds, not just rounds in which an \imbalance"
occurs.
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revealer rules of thumb, and the Equal Decision-Weight Model. This result
acquires additional signi¯cance in light of the fact that the instructions could
be interpreted as having an institutional-neutrality bias.6
Result 3 Individuals do not behave as private information revealers nor as
public information revealers. Furthermore, we can reject the Equal
Decision-Weight Model as a statistical representation of the data for
the individualistic and majority rule institutions
Support Tables 5-7 present the p-levels for the following hypotheses, re-
spectively: individuals are private information revealers (H0 : ¯ = 0),
individuals are public information revealers (H0 : ° = 0), and individ-
uals act according to the Equal Decision-Weight Model (H0 : ¯ = °).
We reject the private information revealer rule of thumb: the hypoth-
esis ¯ = 0 can be rejected at the 1% signi¯cance level for the indi-
vidualistic and majority rule institutions, and can be rejected at the
5% signi¯cance level for the conformity rewarding institution (Table
5). Next we test the hypothesis that the individuals are public infor-
mation revealers. Because the ¯rst mover every period has no public
6Constant across institutions were the instructions that subjects should try to guess
the \urn that he or she thinks is more likely to have been used" (see Appendix).
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information, and therefore, cannot be a public information revealer, we
test H0 : ° = 0 where ° is the estimate of the coe±cient on private
information for positions 2-10 only. We can reject the null at all rea-
sonable levels of signi¯cance (Table 6). Lastly, we ¯nd that we can
reject the hypothesis H0 : ¯ = ° at all reasonable levels of signi¯cance
for the individualistic and majority rule institutions, and therefore, we
can reject the Equal Decision-Weight Model (Table 7).
We have shown that we can rule out some rules which predict that the
institution does not matter. Now we turn our attention to the di®erences in
behavior and information production that can be attributed to the change
in institution. Table 8 summarizes Results 4-6.
Result 4 Institutions change the information production of the system and
the use of information by the individual. In particular, behavior changes
in the ways suggested by a theory of strategic agents:
1. Cascades observed can be ordered from least to most frequent
depending on the institution that is in place: majority rule, indi-
vidualistic, conformity rewarding
2. Individual expressions (decisions and votes) re°ect private infor-
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mation the most (in descending order): majority rule, individual-
istic, conformity rewarding.
3. The weight placed on publicly available information relative to
the weight placed on privately available information increases as
we change the institution from majority rule to the individual
decision setting to the conformity rewarding rule.
Support For each of the above results, we ¯nd that:
1. 39% of majority rule rounds, 77.5% of individualistic institution
rounds, and 96.7% of conformity rewarding rounds result in cas-
cades or partial cascades.
2. 92% of announcements in majority rule rounds, 85% of announce-
ments in individualistic institution rounds, and 64.7% of announce-
ments in conformity rewarding rounds are signal-revealing.
3. Under majority rule, subjects place more than seven times asmuch
weight on private information than on public information: ¯
°
=
0:13. Subjects place more than twice as much weight on private
than on public information under the individualistic institution:
¯
°
= 0:37. Only under the conformity rewarding institution do
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subjects place more weight on public than on private information:
¯
°
= 1:24
We now explore the additional measures of system performance. To mea-
sure the e±ciency of systemic decisions, we calculate the proportion of de-
cisions that coincide with the fully informed decision, the decision that an
omniscient agent would make if he knew the entire sequence of signals. Pe-
riods in which the posteriors used in calculating the fully informed decision
equal 0.5 were left out.
Result 5 We can rank the institutions in the order of highest to lowest
e±ciency of systemic decision: majority rule, individualistic, and con-
formity rewarding.
Support The means of the proportions of systemic decisions that match
that of the omniscient agent for the individualistic majority rule, and
conformity rewarding institutions, respectively, are 0.82, 0.94 and 0.74
(Table 8). In fact, with only two exceptions, the e±ciency of systemic
decision equals one under the majority rule institution. Under the indi-
vidualistic institution, we see an increase in the number of proportions
that fall below 0.5. Under the conformity rewarding institution, we
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see that all the proportions lie at one extreme or the other: all obser-
vations are either greater than or equal to 0.8 or less than or equal to
0.1.
Consider the quality of information production. Figures 1-3 compare the
posterior probabilities of urn A given the aggregate announcements with the
posterior probabilities of urn A given the aggregate signals.
Result 6 The overall quality of public information is biased (ascending or-
der): majority rule, individualistic, and conformity rewarding.
Support The average quality of information production is 0.98 under the
majority rule institution (Table 8). This is not surprising given that
92% of the announcements are signal revealing. The average absolute
di®erence between the posterior probabilities given the private signals
and the posterior probabilities given the announcements under the indi-
vidualistic institution is more than twice as large as under the majority
rule institution, and is re°ected by a quality of information production
of 0.85. Lastly, under the conformity rewarding institution, the average
absolute di®erence is twice that of the individualistic institution: 0.30,
and therefore, the quality of information production is 0.70.
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Figures 1-3 o®ers further support for this result. The posterior prob-
abilities given the private signals is along the x-axis and the posterior
probabilities given the announcements is along the y-axis. For a given
round, if these probabilities are identical, then the data point associ-
ated with that period will lie on the 45 degree line. Under the majority
rule institution, all but a few points lie directly on the 45 degree line.
This occurs less frequently under the individualistic rare, and it is rare
to see points on the 45 degree line under the conformity rewarding
institution. We see that under the conformity rewarding institution,
there are large discrepancies between the series of probabilities. While
in the individualistic institution, we see large discrepancies in 9% of
the periods, in the conformity rewarding institution, we ¯nd 20% of
the periods have posteriors that di®er by more than 0.5 points.
8 Conclusion
While keeping the technologies of communication constant, we examine the
e®ects on information aggregation and production under three di®erent in-
stitutions: the individualistic institution, which is that studied by Anderson
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and Holt (1997), the majority rule institution, and the conformity-rewarding
institution. The results of Anderson and Holt replicate (Result 1). In
our experiments we observe the phenomena they report. The experiments
reported here re°ect a di®erent subject pool, di®erent procedures, comput-
erized processes, di®erent payo®s, and many other things. It follows that the
Anderson and Holt discovery is robust to changes in these classes of variables.
In addition, we ¯nd marked changes in individual behavior and infor-
mation production due to the change in institution. Individual decisions
change as institutions change and the changes are understandable in terms
of theory. In particular, majority rule is more \truth" revealing than ei-
ther of the other institutions. Conformity rewarding procedures do produce
conformity, but at the expense of data revealing choices (Result 4). The loss
due to misjudgments about the state are highest under conformity rewarding
institutions.
In terms of information production, an outside observer learns the most
from observing a majority rule process and the least from a conformity re-
warding process (Results 5 and 6). This supports the predicted inverse
relationship between quality of information production and prevalence of
cascades.
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In examining individual behavior, the di®erences in behavior due to the
institution follow the direction expected. The weight that individuals place
on public information, relative to private information, in making decisions is
highest under the conformity rewarding institution; indeed, this is the only
institution under which public information is weighed more than private in-
formation. At the other extreme, under the majority rule institution, the
least weight is put on the public information relative to the private informa-
tion (Result 4).
Result 3 rules out simple rule of thumb models of behavior in which strate-
gic behavior has no part. The results reported here suggest that individuals
act strategically, and that individuals believe that others act strategically.
Clearly, there is much work to be done in developing a model of how indi-
viduals use the public information, together with their private information,
and their beliefs about the behavior of others to come to their decisions.
The pattern of results suggest two important messages. The ¯rst message
is that patterns of conformity widely observed in social behavior can result
from a deeper motivation than simply a \desire to conform." Decisions of
others contain information that is important for incorporation with \own
decisions." Notice that even though cascades exist, they are not overwhelm-
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ingly ine±cient. Indeed, \going along with the group" is not all bad. It
re°ects an element of wisdom. For example, under the individualistic insti-
tution the system e±ciency would be 71.6% if all individuals made decisions
according to their private information alone. If they were naive Bayesians the
system e±ciency would have been 83.1%. The actual e±ciency was 81.7%.
Thus, the naive Bayesian behavior, which produces substantial cascades also
produces a substantial improvement in decisions from a social point of view.
Interestingly enough, the fact that actual systemic e±ciency falls short of
that of naive Bayesians suggests that individuals do not pay enough atten-
tion to others.
The second message is that care must be taken in the design of collective
decision process. The rules of the institution make a di®erence and that
di®erence is understandable in terms of rational and strategic positions in
which the rules place individuals.
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9 Appendices
9.1 Instructions
The following is the instructions from experiment 4. The instruc-
tions from experiments 1-3 are similar and can be obtained from
42
the authors.
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making. Various agen-
cies have provided funds for the experiment. Your earnings will be paid to
you privately, in cash, at the end of the experiment.
In this experiment you will be asked to predict from which randomly
chosen urn a ball was drawn. It is equally likely that urn A or urn B will be
drawn. Urn A contains 2 red balls, and 1 white ball. Urn B contains 1 red
ball and 2 white balls.
To help you determine which urn has been selected, each person will be
allowed to see one ball, chosen at random, from the urn. The result of this
draw will be your private information and should not be shared with the other
participants. After each draw, we will return the ball to the container before
making the next private draw. Each person will have one private draw, with
the ball being replaced after each draw. This is done on the computer. When
it is your turn to see your draw, the upper right hand corner of your window
will read. \Your draw is WHITE" if the ball the computer has randomly
drawn for you is white, and \Your draw is RED" if the ball the computer
has randomly drawn for you is red. The order in which you see your draw is
randomly determined every period.
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After each person has seen his or her draw, each subject will be asked to
input the letter of the urn (A or B) that he or she thinks is more likely to
have been used. The person who was chosen to see his draw ¯rst will input
his letter in the box labeled \Input here." Everyone will then be able to see
his choice in the last line of their windows. The second person will then see
her draw, and will be asked to input the letter of the urn the she thinks is
more likely, and everyone will be able to see her choice in the last line of
their windows. This process will be repeated until all remaining people have
made decisions. Finally we will inform everyone of the urn that was actually
used.
Your earnings are determined as follows: if your decision matches the urn
that was actually used then you earn $0.25. Otherwise you lose $0.25. In
addition, if your decision matches the majority of the group's decisions, then
you earn an additional $0.75. Otherwise you lose an additional $0.75. For
example, if 7 people announce \urn A" and 3 people announce \urn B," then
the group decision is \urn A." If you announce \urn B," and if the actual
urn used is urn A, then you will earn -$0.25+0.75 = -$1.00. If you announce
\urn A," and if the actual urn used is urn A, then you will earn $0.25+0.75
= $1.00. If you announce \urn B," and if the actual urn used is urn B, then
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you will earn $0.25-0.75 = -0.50. If you announce \urn A," and the actual
urn used is urn B, then you will earn -$0.25+0.75 = 0.50. In the case of a
tie, the group decision will be randomly chosen: it is equally likely that the
group decision will be A or B.
The experiment will consist of many periods. The results for each period
should be recorded on a separate row on the decision sheet in front of you.
The period numbers are listed on the left side of each row. Next to the
period number is a blank that should be used to record the draw (RED or
WHITE) when it appears in your window. Write R (for Red) or W (for
White) in column (0) at the time the draw is made. The columns numbered
(1) through (10) should be used to record the decisions of others as they
appear on your screen. When you are asked to input the letter of an urn,
you will be able to see the decisions, if any, that have been made previously by
other participants. Write your decision in the column, (1) through (10), that
corresponds to the order in which you have been approached, and circle your
decision to distinguish it from others' decisions. When all participants have
made their choices, the group decision will appear on your screen. Record
this letter in column (11). Then the letter of the urn that was actually used
will appear on your screen. Record this letter in column (12). Record you
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payo® in column (13)
In addition, at the end of each round, everybody's choices will be recorded
in the large area at the center of the window along with the actual urn used,
your payo® for the round, and your cumulative payo®. Note that your choice
will be capitalized. Always check to make sure that your information and
payo®s on your decision sheet match those on your screen.
Before we begin the actual experiment, we will go through a demonstra-
tion period. We will demonstrate the process in which the actual urn is
chosen, and the process by which the draws are made. Note that, in the
actual experiment, the computer will choose the actual urn, as well as make
the draws for each individual.
At this time, we will °ip a coin. If the result if the coin °ip is heads, then
urn A will be used, and if the result of the coin °ip is tails, then urn B will
be used. We will now draw a ball for the ¯rst person to see. If this were not
a demonstration period, then this person would record the color of the ball
(R or W) in column (0), make a decision, and enter it in column (1), and
circle it. Then everyone else would record this decision in column (1), but
would not circle this decision since it is not your own.
Next, we will now draw a ball for the next person to see. If this were not
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a demonstration period, this person would record the color of this ball (L
or D) in column (0), make a decision (A or B), enter it in the appropriate
column, and circle it. Then everyone else would record this decision in the
appropriate column.
Are there any questions before we begin? Please do not talk with anyone
during the experiment. We will insist that everyone remain silent until the
end of the last period. If we observe you communicating with anyone during
else during the experiment we will ask you to leave without completing the
experiment.
It is very important that you do not open other windows or leave the
page in front of you while the experiment is running.
Before we begin the actual periods, we will go through a practice period,
for which you will not be paid.
After round 15, the following was read to the subjects:
That concludes the ¯rst part of the experiment. For the second part, the
procedure is the same, but your payo® will be determined as follows: if your
own decision matches the letter of the urn used, you will earn $1, otherwise,
you will lose $1. For this part of the experiment, leave column (11) blank.
At the end of each round, record the letter of the urn that was actually used
47
in column (12). If your decision matches this urn, then record $1 in column
(13). Otherwise, record -$1.
9.2 Tables and Figures
Table 1: Experimental Design
Exp Periods in which institution is in e®ect Payo®s Computer
individualistic majority conformity
1 1-28 $2, 0 No
2 1-10, 26-36 11-25 $2, -2 Yes
3 11-25 1-10, 26-38 $1, -1 Yes
4 16-30, 46-55 1-15, 31-45 $.75, -.75 / $.25, -.25 Yes
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Table 2: Predictions of the Models of Behavior
Model Institution ¯° Cascades E® of system Qual of ip
Rankings
Private info individualistic ¯ = 0 6 5 1
majority rule ¯ = 0 6 1 1
conf rewarding ¯ = 0 6 5 1
Public info all ° = 0 1 6 6
Naive Bayesian all ¯° = 1 3 4 4
Strategic individualistic ¯° < 1 4 3 3
majority rule ¯° << 1 5 2 2
conf rewarding ¯° > 1 2 5 5
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Table 3: Logit Regression Estimates. Standard errors are in parentheses
n ® ¯ ° Log-likelihood
individualistic overall 890 0.062 1.142 3.046 -219.4749
(.124) (.088) (.225)
exp1 280 0.011 0.904 3.382 -62.4918
(.235) (.131) (.420)
exp2 210 -0.225 1.273 2.790 -54.8688
(:251) (:194) (:452)
exp3 150 0.564 1.708 4.266 -24.603
(:387) (:358) (:858)
exp4 250 0.155 1.149 2.794 -68.503
(:220) (:167) (:385)
majority rule overall 380 -0.001 0.523 3.89 -88.1445
(.212) (.109) (.342)
exp2 150 -0.112 0.624 3.139 -47.1357
(:277) (:161) (:450)
exp3 230 0.250 0.457 4.793 -35.8739
(:368) (:162) (:583)
conformity rewarding overall 300 -0.026 4.063 3.293 -26.1855
(:359) (:839) (:742)
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Table 4: Test of urn bias
p-level for H0 : ® = 0
individualistic overall 0.6187
exp1 0.9614
exp2 0.3705
exp3 0.1449
exp4 0.479
Table 5: Test of Private Information Revealer Rule of Thumb
p-level for H0 : ¯ = 0
individualistic overall 0.000
exp1 0.000
exp2 0.000
exp3 0.000
exp4 0.000
majority rule overall 0.000
exp2 0.000
exp3 0.000
conformity rewarding overall 0.011
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Table 6: Test of Public Information Revealer Rule of Thumb
p-level for H0 : ° = 0
individualistic overall 0.0000
exp1 0.0000
exp2 0.0000
exp3 0.0000
exp4 0.0000
majority rule overall 0.0000
exp2 0.0000
exp3 0.0000
conformity rewarding overall 0.0000
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Table 7: Test of Equal-Decision Weight Model
p-level for H0 : ¯ = °
individualistic overall 0.0000
exp1 0.0000
exp2 0.0000
exp3 0.0000
exp4 0.0000
majority rule overall 0.0000
exp2 0.0000
exp3 0.0000
conformity rewarding overall 0.1999
Table 8: Experimental Results: Occurence of information cascades and Measures of system performance
Institution ¯
°
Cascades E® of system Qual of ip
% occurence Means
individualistic ¯° = 0:3749 77.5% 0.817 0.85
majority rule ¯° = 0:1344 39% 0.943 0.98
conf rewarding ¯° = 1:2338 96.7% 0.75 0.70
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Figure 1:  Comparison of Posterior Probabilities
Individualistic Institution
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Figure 2:  Comparison of Posterior Probabilities
Majority Rule Institution
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 Figure 3:  Comparison of Posterior Probabilities
Conformity Rewarding Institution
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